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PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE PRIVITY
REQUIREMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
"Products Liability," is now an identifiable class of liti-
gation. It involves the liability of a manufacturer, processor,
or seller to a buyer or third party for personal or property
damage caused by their products. There are three issues
present in every products liability case which must be prov-
en: (1) that the product is of such a nature that it was
capable of causing the injury; (2) that this product was
actually the proximate cause of the injury; and (3) that
the defendant was legally responsible for the product causing
the injury.1 Another important issue, although not found
in every products liability case, is the requirement of privity
of contract. 2 When required, it operates to bar recovery
for product-caused harm where there is no pre-existing con-
tractual relationship between the injured party and the party
sought to be held liable. Thus A, who purchased hair dye
manufactured by B from retailer C, can, if she loses her
hair, seek recovery from C, but not from B because there
is no privity of contract with B. If one of A's family, or
a friend, uses the hair dye and his hair falls out, they
cannot seek recovery from either B or C because of the
lack of privity. This, of course, insulates the manufacturer
and sometimes the retailer, from any liability they may
have to a consumer for injuries caused by their products.
The dictum regarding privity of contract, as found in
Winterbottom v. Wright,3 an 1842 English case, was adopted
by the majority of American courts to make our infant in-
1. 1 HURSH, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1:2 (1961).
2. See generally id. Ch. 6.
3. 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). It is interesting to
note that the action in this case was against a contractor and not a manu-
facturer. But cf. Donoghue (or M'Alister) v. Stevenson; (1932) A. C. 562
(Eng.); Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills. L., (1936) A. C. 85 (Eng.).
These cases represent England's subsequent recognition of exceptions to
the privity rule.
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dustry immune to any liability caused by their products. 4
But this case, and the majority rule it established, created
much dissatisfaction, and exceptions to the rule soon follow-
ed. 5 In his article, The Assault Upon the Citadel,6 Prosser
points this out:
... In 1842 Lord Abinger foresaw 'the most
absurd and outrageous consequence, to which I can
no limit,' if it should ever be held that the defendant
who made a contract with A would be liable to B
for his failure to perform that contract properly.
What happened in the next century was enough to
make the learned jurist turn in his grave. The
courts began by the usual process of developing ex-
ceptions to the 'general rule' of nonliability to persons
not in privity. The most important of these was that
the seller of a chattel owed to anyone who might be
expected to use it a duty of reasonable care to make
it safe, provided that the chattel was 'inherently' or
'imminently' dangerous . . .
The primary concern of this note is to show what effect
these exceptions and other developments have had on pro-
ducts liability law.
II. LIABILITY IN NEGLIGENCE
The "General rule" requiring privity in negligence actions
for product-caused injuries soon became subject to three
exceptions. The first, and possibly the most important
exception, is where the injury is caused by an "inherently
dangerous" product.8 Under this rule, products must be
dangerous by their very nature and not because of some
4. See Bordwell v. Collie, 45 N.Y. 494 (1871); National Sav. Bank v.
Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879); Cf. Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co.,
120 F. 865 (8th Cir. 1903), 61 L.R.A. 303 (three exceptions to privity rule).
It should be pointed out that privity was required in both negligence and
warranty actions. This forced the doctrine of Caveat Emptor upon the
consumer in order to protect industry during its early stages of develop-
ment.
5. See Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852). Liability for negli-
gence in the marketing of products dangerous by their very nature.
6. 69 Yale L. J. 1099 (1960).
7. See generally 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY
§ 5.02 (1960).
8. Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852). A landmark decision which
held drug dealer liable for injuries caused by selling poison labeled as a
harmless drug even though purchased by plaintiff's husband.
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defect2 Poisons,I" firearms,"' explosives 12  and unwhole-
some food 13 are just a few of the products considered inherent-
ly dangerous. The second exception is where a person fur-
nishes a defective product on his premises for an invitee to
use. 14  The third exception is where the product sold or
delivered is known to be "imminently dangerous" and the
defendant failed to disclose that fact to the buyer. 15 These
exceptions, although helpful, were still considered by many
as being too limited in scope and having a stifling effect
on the further development of products liability law.
In 1916, the privity rule was finally overcome by its ex-
ceptions. 6 In the famous case, McPherson v. Buick Motor
Co., Judge Cardozo stated: "If the nature of a thing is
such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb
in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger."
This statement later became the basis of the modern rule
or what is sometimes known as the "imminently danger-
ous" exception. 8 Consequently, the manufacturer is liable
for negligence if his product causes injury under the follow-
ing circumstances: (1) when the product is lawfully used
in a manner and for a purpose for which it was made; (2)
when a manufacturer fails to exercise reasonable care or to
recognize whether or not it had been carefully made; and
(3) when it places those lawfully using it, including those
in the vicinity of its probable use, in a state of unreasonable
risk.19 A 1946 case summed up the effect of this rule by
stating:
9. It should be distinguished that "inherently dangerous" means dan-
gerous by its very nature whereas "imminently dangerous" Indicates a
particular defect.
10. National Say. Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1880); Merrill v. Beaute
Vues Corp., 235 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1956).
11. Herman v. Markham Air Rifle Co., 258 F. 475 (E.D. Mich., 1919).
12. Cadillac Motor Car Co. v. Johnson, 221 F. 801 (2nd Cir. 1915).
13. Ketterer v. Armour & Co., 247 F. 921 (2nd Cir. 1917); Cook v. People's
Milk Co., 90 Misc. 34, 152 N.Y. Supp. 465 (1915).
14. Coughtry v. Globe Woolen Co., 56 N.Y. 124 (1874); Bright v. Barnett
& Record Co., 88 Wis. 299, 60 N.W. 418 (1894).
15. Lewis v. Terry, 111 Cal. 39, 43 Pac. 398 (1896); Huset v. J. I. Case
Threshing Machine Co., 12 F. 865 (8th Cir. 1903) (also known as the fraud
exception).
16. "The MacPherson case caused the exception to swallow the assert-
ed general rule of non-liability leaving nothing upon which that rule could
operate." Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693, 700 (1946).
17. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916).
18. See generally, 1 HURSH, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIA-
I31LITY § 6:24 (1961).
19. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 395 (1934).
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The time has come for us to recognize that the
asserted general (privity) rule no longer exists. In
principal it was unsound. It tended to produce unjust
results. It has been abandoned by the great weight
of authority elsewhere. We now abandon it in this
Commonwealth.
20
So it seems that the courts have followed, and will con-
tinue to follow, the MacPherson view and leave the rule of
Winterbottom v. Wright back in the Nineteenth Century.
21
Throwing out the privity requirement in negligence cases
was a big step in products liability law. But the proof of
negligence on the part of the manufacturer or vendor, even
with the help of res ipsa loquitur,22 or by showing the de-
fendant violated a safety or pure food and drug statute 32 ,
may be difficult. In many cases, it can be proven that the
product manufactured or sold by the defendant did in fact
cause the injury, but--W-ithout proof of negligence the plain-
tiff cannot recover. 24 Many turned to express and implied
warranties only to find the privity requirement deeply im-
bedded in warranty law. So again much dissatisfaction was
found and again courts started their attack upon the privity
requirement.
III. LIABILITY IN IMPLIED WARRANTY
Warranty started out in English Common Law as a tort
concept and later indebitatus assumpsit was used as a remedy
for its breach which brought it into contract law. 25 As a
result thereof, privity of contract soon became a requirement
to sue for a breach of warranty. 26 At that time, manufactur-
ers usually sold their goods directly to the consumer without
the use of an intermediary. Under those circumstances privi-
ty was not a serious burden. But later the middle man
20. Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693, 700 (1946);
Annot. 164 A.IR. 559.
21. State v. Garzele Plastics Industries, 152 F. Sup. 483 (E.D. Mich. 1957).
22. Kuntz v. McQuade, 95 N.W.2d 430 (N.D. 1959); See generally Crabb,
Res Ipsa L-oquittur in North Dakota 38 N.D. L. Rev. 390 (1962).
23. Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961); Doherty v. S.S.
Kresge Co., 227 Wisc. 661, 278 N.W. 437 (1938).
24. Trolli v. Triple X Stores, 19 Conn. Supp. 293, 112 A.2d 507 (1954).
25. See, Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d
612, 615 (1958); Annot. 75 A.L.R.2d 103.
26. See Longmeid v. Holliday, 6 Ex. D 761, 155 Eng. Rep. 752 (1851);
Thomas v. Lucas, 17 W.R. 520 (1868).
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became an important element of marketing and the consumer,
not being in privity with the manufacturer, began having
difficulty recovering damages for breach of warranty.
Here again, to overcome the requirement of privity,
courts resorted to exceptions and in some cases, even fic-
tions. 2  The most notable and widespread exception placed
strict liability upon the manufacturers and vendors of food
and beverage products.2 8  This was later broadened to in-
clude other products intended for internal human consump-
tion, whether consumed orally or otherwise.21 Eventually,
makers and sellers of products intended for intimate external
bodily use became strictly liable for injuries caused 0 This,
of course, created problems in relation to allergies and the
hypersensitive consumer .3 Some have also applied the ex-
ception to the container of a product, 32  animal food, 33 and
explosives.
3 4
In 1958, Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry
Supply, 35 held that privity was not needed to sue for breach
27. See Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305
(1927) (warranty runs with the goods); Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co.,
14 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939) (public policy requires warranty to in-
ure to the consumer's benefit); Madouros v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottl-
ing Co., 230 Mo. App. 275, 90 S.W.2d 445 (1936) (assignment): Ward Bak-
ing Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928) (third-party bene-
ficiary); Flesher v. Carstens Packing Co., 93 Wash. 48, 160 P. 14, 17 (1916)
(action in tort, not contract); Campbell Soup Co. v. Ryan, 328 S.W.2d 821
(Tex. Civ. App., 1959) (action not in tort or contract but on public policy).
See Generally Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 Ore. L. Rev. 119,
153-154 (1958) for a complete list of exceptions and fictions.
28. Greenburg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 213 N.Y.S.2d .39, 173 N.E.2d 773
(1961), Annot. 75 A.L.R.2d 39; Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex.
609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942), Annot. 142 A.L.R. 1479 (leading packaged food
case): Ada Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Asbury. 206 Okla. 269. 242 P.2d 417
(1952); Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927)
(beverage).
29. See Bowles v. Zimmerman Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1960).
Annot. 76 A.L.R.2d 120 (pin inserted in plaintiff's femur in cpurse of an
operation; Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 182 Cal. App. 2d 694, 6 Cal.
Rptr. 320 (1960), Annot. 79 A.L.R.2d 290 (innoculation of polio vaccine).
30. Graham v. Bottenfield's Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954) (hair
dye); Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins, 106 Ohio App. 265, 149 N.E.2d
181 (1958) (permanent wave solution).
31. See generally 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY,
Ch. 8 (1961).
32. See Canada ])ry Bottling Co. v. Shaw, 118 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1960);
Nichola v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317 (1953). Contra, Escola v. Coca
Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944); Soter v. Griesediech
West Brewery Co., 200 Okla. 302, 193 P.2d 575 (1948).
33. See, McAfee v.- Cargill, 121 F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Cal. 1954); Midwest
Game Co. v. M.F.A. Milling Co., 320 S.W.2d 547 (Mo 1959).
34. See United States Cas. Co. v. Hercules Powder Co. 4 N.J. Super
444, 67 A.2d 880 (1949); Hentschel v. Baby Bathinette Corp., 215 F.2d 102
(2nd Cir. 1954).
35. 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958).
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of implied warranty on cinder blocks. The ruling of this
case, plus prior exceptions 3 to the privity rule, tends to
indicate that Michigan has thrown out the privity require-
ment altogether. In his opinion Justice Voelker criticized
prior Michigan decisions for requiring privity and then mak-
ing exceptions to the rule which tend to "maim and muddy
up the larger field of law in both contracts and torts." But
there appeared to be some confusion as to the distinction
between negligence and warranty theories which deadened
its effect3 Also in 1958, an intermediate Florida court
held that privity between the manufacturer and purchaser
of electric cable was unnecessary, 3 but a later decision by
the Florida Supreme Court made this holding questionable.3 9
In 1959, another intermediate court, this time in Pennsyl-
vania, held that privity is not needed for breach of implied
warranty and this decision still stands.4 0  Minnesota has
hinted that they will dispense with privity when the occasion
arises.
41
In 1960, New Jersey apparently decided that it was time
the requirement of privity, to allow suit for breach of implied
warranty, be discarded without the help of exceptions or
fictions. In their landmark decision of Henningson v. Bloom-
field Motor Co., the court held the manufacturer and seller
of a defective automobile liable for resultant injuries to the
purchaser's wife even though she was not in privity with
either of them. Confronted with the problem of privity, Jus-
tice Francis stated:
With the advent of mass marketing, the man-
ufacturer became remote from the purchaser, sales
were accomplished through intermediaries, and the
demand for the product was created by advertising
media. In such an economy it became obvious that
the consumer was the person being cultivated. Mani-
36. See Hertzler v. Manshum, 228 Mich. 416, 200 N.W. 155 (1924) (food
exception); Ebers v. General Chemical Co., 310 Mich. 261, 17 N.W.2d 176
(1945) (insecticide).
37. Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, supra note 36
at 877-881; confusion was cleared up by Manzoni v. Detroit Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 363 Mich. 235, 241, 109 N.W.2d 918, 922 (1961).
38. Continental Copper & Steel Indust. v. "Red" Cornelius, 104 So. 2d
40 (Fla. 1958).
39. McBurnette v. Playground Equip. Corp., 137 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1962).
40. Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959).
41. Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543 at 561, 99 N.W.2d 670 at 681-82
(1959) (dictum).
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festly, the connotation of 'consumer' was broader than
that of 'buyer'. He signified such a person who, in
the reasonable contemplation of the parties to the
sale, might be expected to use the product. Thus,
where the commodities sold are such that if defective-
ly manufactured they will be dangerous to life or limb,
then society's interests can only be protected by elim-
inating the requirement of privity between the maker
and his dealers and the reasonably expected ultimate
consumer. In that way the burden of losses conse-
quent upon use of defective articles is borne by those
who are in a position to either control the danger or
make an equitable distribution of the losses when they
do occur . . .43
Accordingly, we hold that under modern market-
ing conditions, when a manufacturer puts a new auto-
mobile in the stream of trade and promotes its pur-
chase by the public, an implied warranty that it is
reasonably suitable for use as such accompanies it
into the hands of the ultimate purchaser. Absence of
agency between the manufacturer and the dealer who
makes the ultimate sale is immaterial.
4 4
It is safe to say the Henningson case will have consid-
erable influence on other jurisdictions in the future.
IV. LIABILITY IN EXPRESS WARRANTY
Unlike implied warranties, which are imposed by law,
express warranties arise when a manufacturer or seller
makes positive affirmations of fact concerning his goods
to the buyer.4 5 Through radio, television, newspapers, maga-
zines, billboards, brochures and labels the manufacturer or
seller constantly makes such representations directly to the
nonsumer. For this reason the "advertised product" excep-
tion has arisen providing consumers with a means of
circumventing the privity requirement. The first case to
use this exception was Baxter v. Ford Motor Co.4 6  Here,
42. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), Annot. 75 A.L.R.2d 1. It should be
pointed out that this case also held that the manufacturer's express war-
ranty disclaiming or limiting implied warranties is void as against public
policy. But a 1962 North Dakota case held that such was not contrary to
public policy. Knecht v. Universal Motor Co., 113 N.W.2d 688 (N.D. 1962); 38
N.D. L Rev. 529.
43. 1d. at 80-81.
44. I'd. at 84.
45. See N.D. Cent. Code § 51-01-13.
46. 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932), 88 A.L.R. 521 (1934).
1963] NOTES
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the plaintiff lost an eye when a stone shattered the window
of a car he had purchased from a dealer. There was printed
matter circulated by the defendant-manufacturer which rep-
resented the car's windows to be shatter-proof. The court
held that privity should not bar the consumer when manu-
facturers create "a demand for their products by representing
that they possess qualities which they, 'in fact, do not pos-
sess. ' ' 47 Since the Baxter case, this exception has been follow-
ed by many cases dealing with expressed warranties.4 8
V. CONCLUSION
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that the
privity requirement is on its way out. Many jurisdictions
have reduced its importance, with exceptions, and some have
buried it altogether. It seems that the main reason for
dispensing with privity is to modernize the law. In Randy
Knitware, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 49 Judge Fuld
points this out:
In concluding that the old court-made rule should
be modified to dispense with the requirement of privi-
ty, we are doing nothing more or less than carrying
out an historic and necessary function of the court
to bring the law into harmony 'with modern-day needs
and with concepts of justice and fair dealing.' 50
In North Dakota, the status of the privity requirement
is questionable. There are no cases in the negligence
area and one -one case in warranty. This was the 1931
case of Wood v. Advance Rumely Thresher Co., 51 in which
the North Dakota Supreme Court held that a right of action
for breach of warranty in an order for farm machinery
could not be had by a subsequent purchaser, and that the
subsequent sale of property by the purchaser does not oper-
47. I'd. at 412.
48. See Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309
(1939) (car roof advertised as seamless); Worley v. Procter & Gamble Mfg.
Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (1952) (detergent labeled "kind to
hands"); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d
612 (1958), Annot. 75 A.L.R.2d 103 (1961) (advertised as safe and harmless);
Randy Knitware, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 226 N.Y.S.2d
363, 181 N.E.2d 399 (1962)) (advertised that a "Cyana" treated fabric will
not shrink or stretch out); generally, 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PROD-
UCTS LIABILITY § 16.04(4) (1960).
49. 11 N.Y.2d 5, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363, 181 N.E.2d 399 (1962).
50. Id at 404.
51. 60 N.D. 384, 234 N.W. 517 (1931).
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ate to vest in the subsequent purchaser any right of action
against the original seller for a breach of warranty. Furth-
ermore, there must be privity of contract between the
parties in order to maintain an action for a breach thereof.
It should be pointed out that at the time of this
decision no other jurisdiction held contrary to this North
Dakota decision. The abolition of privity in negligence
cases was well under way but little had been done in war-
ranty cases. Not until just recently have there been any
decisions casting aside privity in warranty cases. With
these developments in the law of products liability, courts
are more apt to discard the privity requirement or at least
make a reasonable exception to it. Of course, much de-
pends upon the individual case in deciding this question.
Until the Supreme Court of North Dakota is confronted with
this issue, we can only speculate upon the out come.
PHILIP J. TEIGEN
